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SOFT LAW, HARD MARKETS: 
COMPETITIVE SELF-INTEREST AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 
Ralph G. Steinhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
o multinational corporations have enforceable obligations to pro-
tect international human rights? If they do, two principles lying at 
the foundations of two traditionally separate bodies of law—corporate 
law and international human rights law—must be reconceived and rec-
onciled. In corporate law, the bedrock principle of shareholder primacy 
requires a corporation’s directors and officers to maximize the return on 
their shareholders’ investment.1 One dominant critique of the corporate 
responsibility initiative suggests that it subverts shareholder primacy by 
requiring management to develop an expertise in human rights law and 
exercise de facto control over abuses generally committed by govern-
ments, raising costs without raising revenues.2 In international human 
rights law, the bedrock principle of state responsibility traditionally 
places a comprehensive obligation on governments to protect human 
rights and either imposes no obligations on non-state actors like corpora-
tions or imposes obligations only in extraordinary circumstances defined 
by international agreement. From that perspective, the corporate human 
                                                                                                                                  
 *  Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law and Director of the Oxford Pro-
gram in International Human Rights Law, George Washington University Law School. 
J.D. (Harvard University); B.A. (Bowdoin College). I am grateful to Stephen Walls for 
his splendid and spirited research assistance. Special thanks to the editors and staff of the 
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 1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corpora-
tion is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end.”). See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 rep. note 1 (Am. Law Inst. 
1994) (“Some cases, mostly arising before the turn of the century, applied the concept 
reflected in Dodge v. Ford, a strict notion of ultra vires, or both, to strictly preclude the 
utilization of corporate resources, either by way of donation or otherwise, for humanitar-
ian, educational, philanthropic, or public welfare activities.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 133 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1962) (“Few trends could so thoroughly un-
dermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials 
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as 
possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.”). 
D 
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rights initiative dilutes the “state primacy” principle and poses a contro-
versial distraction from the already daunting task of getting government 
actors to take human rights law seriously. 
In contemporary corporate and international law, the doctrines of 
shareholder supremacy3 and state responsibility4 have lost their simple 
rigidity, but a puzzle persists: in what circumstances—if any—may civil 
or criminal liability be imposed on a company for violating human rights 
standards, and how—if at all—will those obligations be enforced? 
I have previously argued that the emerging standards of corporate re-
sponsibility rest on four separate but compatible regimes of doctrine and 
practice, each with its own characteristic modes of enforcement:5 (i) a 
market-based regime,6 or “human rights entrepreneurialism,” under 
which corporations compete for consumers and investors by conforming 
to international human rights standards; (ii) a regime of domestic regula-
tion,7 exemplified by sanctions or boycott legislation, which channels 
                                                                                                                                  
 3. The shareholder primacy principle, insofar as it reflected an assumption that cor-
porate altruism is inherently unprofitable, has been qualified considerably: 
(a) . . . a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activi-
ties with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain. 
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) is obliged, to the same extent as 
a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) may take into ac-
count ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the 
responsible conduct of business, and (3) may devote a reasonable amount of re-
sources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic pur-
poses. 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
1, at 55. A contemporary, progressive stream of corporate law scholarship rests on the 
“concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur as a result of managerial ad-
herence to the shareholder primacy principle. Efforts to maximize shareholder wealth are 
often costly to nonshareholders and often come at the expense of particular nonshare-
holder constituent groups.” David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foun-
dations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 1 (Lawrence 
Mitchell ed., Westview Press 1995). 
 4. For at least twenty years, governments have had the obligation, especially under 
the regional human rights systems, to protect against human rights abuses by non-state 
actors. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 347–436 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006). 
 5. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of Hu-
man Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177–
226 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005). Part III of this Article replicates this 
prior work. 
 6. Id. at 180. 
 7. Id. at 187. 
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corporate behavior to advance a rights-based foreign policy; (iii) a re-
gime of civil liability,8 enforced through private lawsuits in domestic 
courts and exemplified in the United States by actions under the Alien 
Tort Statute (“ATS”),9 such as the Holocaust litigation10 and the Unocal 
case;11 and (iv) a regime of international regulation and quasi-
regulation12 by both intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations, based on a variety of international instru-
ments of varying formality and legal status, in order to minimize the role 
that multinational corporations play in the violation of human rights. 
These four regimes do not preclude the evolution of other approaches 
to corporate responsibility,13 nor do they operate independently of one 
another: developments in one regime have direct effects in another. Nor 
is there any argument that the law of corporate human rights responsibil-
ity is fully formed and operable in any of these four areas. But the coher-
ence of these developments with one another suggests that contemporary 
analysts—whether corporate counsel or human rights advocates, not to 
                                                                                                                                  
 8. Id. at 194. 
 9. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (de-
scendants of Jewish customers of French financial institutions sued for damages, alleging 
conspiracy to expropriate assets and failure to disgorge these assets to their rightful own-
ers post-Holocaust); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(class action brought against German corporations, seeking damages for enforced labor 
during the Holocaust and for oppressive living and working conditions). 
 11. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 12. Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 202. 
 13. It is conceivable for example that a regime of corporate criminal responsibility is 
in prospect, as several papers in this Symposium suggest. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, 
Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955 (2008); Jonathan 
Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 
33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899 (2008). See also Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 22, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007). In particular, 
the Special Representative noted the following:  
 
[C]orporate responsibility is being shaped through the interplay of two develop-
ments: one is the expansion and refinement of individual responsibility by the in-
ternational ad hoc criminal tribunals and the . . . . Statute [of the International 
Criminal Court]; the other is the extension of responsibility for international crimes 
to corporations under domestic law. The complex interaction between the two is 
creating an expanding web of potential corporate liability for international crimes, 
imposed through national courts. 
 
Id. 
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mention scholars of international law and corporate law—should not ig-
nore or minimize this recent history. 
Other participants in this Symposium have focused on the power and 
the limits of the three regimes that are in principle the most coercive: 
domestic regulation, civil liability, and international regulation.14 In this 
Article, I argue that the least coercive regime—the free and competitive 
marketplace—also serves as a means of enforcing the emerging stan-
dards of corporate responsibility, although my conception of enforce-
ment may initially appeal more to devotees of Adam Smith than to law-
yers.15 The argument is that the law protecting the freedom of competi-
tion allows companies to compete with one another by implementing 
human rights policies and by adopting industry-wide statements of best 
human rights practices. History suggests that these best practices, begin-
ning perhaps as voluntary or aspirational guidelines, can assume a more 
authoritative cast over time and become the best available measure of a 
company’s due diligence and fair dealing.16 The evolution may be grad-
ual and atomistic (e.g., through individual civil claims against non-
complying companies for unfair business practices or false advertising), 
or it may be coordinated through legislation with general application 
(e.g., through “comply or explain” directives designed to increase market 
transparency by maximizing information to consumers, investors, and 
other businesses).17 
The modes by which law emerges from the conduct of corporations in 
the marketplace may vary, the timing may not be linear or uniform, and 
progress—however defined—may not always be discernible. However, 
history offers a tolerable parallel in the medieval and renaissance lex 
mercatoria, the law merchant, which originated in the long-term, mutual, 
and sophisticated self-interest of the entrepreneurial class and which 
gradually became codified in the commercial law of states, ultimately 
emerging as a form of contemporary transnational law. As this Article 
                                                                                                                                  
 14. Nicola M.C.P. Jägers & Marie-José van der Heijden, Corporate Human Rights 
Violations: The Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
833 (2008); Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871 (2008). 
 15. See infra note 61. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. The “comply or explain” principle has become a feature of Europe’s approach to 
corporate governance. The governance codes in the various member states articulate 
norms or recommendations that may not be mandatory, but companies must either com-
ply with these norms or explain publicly why they are not complying with them. See 
Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum on the Comply-or-Explain 
Principle (Feb, 22, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-comply-explain_en.pdf (last visited May 31, 2008).  
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will illustrate, commercial law has characteristically developed from the 
bottom up, following a distinctive normative trajectory, evolving from 
competitive practices into commercial customs and expectations, then 
transforming into the soft law netherworld of principles or model con-
tracts, and finally taking shape as law. In short, norms that corporations 
themselves consider to be in their competitive self-interest may ratchet 
towards normativity and become more recognizably law-like. 
The emerging norms of corporate responsibility in matters of human 
rights can and should be understood in light of this ancient dynamic: sub-
stantively and chronologically, the law merchant followed mercantile 
custom rather than creating, defining, coercing, displacing, or pre-
empting it. From this perspective, the voluntary or aspirational undertak-
ings of entrepreneurs are not only consistent with the emergence of legal 
obligations; they propel and refine them. In addition, appreciating this 
historical trajectory has certain practical consequences for the contempo-
rary practice of law. Quite apart from understanding how legal obliga-
tions evolve from business cultures, the lex mercatoria paradigm of cor-
porate human rights responsibility suggests that the distinctions that 
structure the current debate—between, for example, voluntary aspira-
tions and mandatory obligations, between state and non-state actors, or 
between public international law and private international law—radically 
oversimplify the issues. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I advances a modest em-
pirical claim that multinational corporations have increasingly declared 
their commitment to human rights standards (or some substantial subset 
of them) and that they increasingly compete for customers and investors 
in this mode. Part II makes a normative claim that the justifications for 
this “human rights entrepreneurialism” are multiple and mutually rein-
forcing. Part III advances the analytical claim that links the emerging 
rules of a corporation’s best human rights practice to the ancient lex mer-
catoria. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL CLAIM: HUMAN RIGHTS ENTREPRENEURIALISM 
Many multinational corporations now voluntarily proclaim some 
commitment to human rights, even if the record of their compliance is 
mixed. These unilateral and voluntary commitments take various forms, 
including corporate codes of conduct, which articulate and standardize 
the company’s business practices. The codification initiative began in the 
anti-apartheid18 and pro-environment19 movements, but has grown to 
                                                                                                                                  
 18. The Sullivan Principles, first articulated in 1977 and ultimately incorporated by 
President Reagan into Executive Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36861 (Sept. 9, 1985), 
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address a variety of human rights concerns, like security operations, cor-
ruption, freedom of association, discrimination, child labor, and forced 
labor of any sort. A handful of firms—especially petroleum companies, 
the largest corporations in the world—have even pegged corporate policy 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,20 suggesting that the 
companies were aligning themselves with traditionally governmental 
obligations that go well beyond the rights of workers.21 
                                                                                                                                  
amounted to a voluntary code of conduct for companies doing business in South Africa 
during the apartheid regime. The principles required certain human rights practices, like 
integrated workplaces, fair employment, and affirmative action. They also gave compa-
nies an objective, common, and auditable standard under which their presence in South 
Africa might be defended in the competition for a good corporate image. In 1984, with 
some 125 signatories, the principles were expanded to require companies to take more 
aggressive action against apartheid, tantamount to corporate civil disobedience. The 
principles also provided a benchmark for the managers of municipal pension funds and 
university endowments, and served as the model for the MacBride Principles for compa-
nies doing business in Northern Ireland. By 1987, with only glacial change in South Af-
rica, even the drafters of the Sullivan Principles considered them a failure and urged cor-
porations to withdraw from South Africa altogether. 
 19. In 1989, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) 
adopted the Valdez Principles, which required signatory companies to adopt a variety  
of green practices to protect the biosphere by using renewable resources, disposing  
of wastes properly, disclosing environmental risks, and submitting to an annual  
environmental audit. Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies [C.E.R.E.S.] 
Principles, http://www.ceres.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=416&srcid=811 (last 
visited May 18, 2008). 
 20. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an authoritative articulation of 
governments’ human rights responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948). See also INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 143–64 (Richard Lillich et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corporation, Corporate Responsibility Policy (2002), 
http://www.hess.com/downloads/documents/pdf/csrpolicy.pdf; Chevron Corporation, 
Human Rights Statement (2006), http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronhuman 
rightsstatement.pdf. See also The Body Shop, Human Rights Principles (2006), 
http://www.thebodyshopinternational.com/NR/rdonlyres/023A7009-1E1A-4305-9BA9-
F1845F1EA038/0/Humanrightsprinciples.pdf. This instrument states: 
As a global business, we respect local, cultural and political differences, but 
will always insist that our business activities adhere to basic human rights, as 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights. We will assess all 
our business activities to determine where we have direct or indirect impacts, 
ensure compliance with human rights legislation and strive to have a positive 
impact on our stakeholders and on society at large. We will use objectively 
measurable standards that reflect internationally recognised human rights stan-
dards and conventions. 
Id. at 1.  
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These voluntary, unilateral codes of conduct characteristically address 
the business-to-business relationships of a company with its suppliers 
and vendors. For example, Levis Strauss & Co. (“LS & Co.”), in its 
Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, declared that it “favor[s] 
business partners who share our commitment to contribute to improving 
community conditions” and it “require[s] that [contractors] implement a 
corrective action plan within a specified time period” if “a contractor is 
not complying with [LS & Co.’s Business Partner Terms of Engage-
ment].”22 Moreover, in its Country Assessment Guidelines, LS & Co. 
articulated the criteria it would apply to determine whether doing busi-
ness in a particular country was harming its competitiveness and profit-
ability, including whether the human rights environment would prevent 
the company from “conduct[ing] business activities in a manner that is 
consistent with [LS & Co.’s] Global Sourcing Guidelines and other com-
pany policies.”23 
Equally prominent are rights-sensitive certification and branding initia-
tives in a variety of industries that purport to offer consumers some as-
surance that the products they buy were not produced in ways that violate 
the rights of workers or broader communities. When, for example, the 
World Diamond Council realized that the world market for diamonds 
was undermined by consumer fears of conflict diamonds, it developed 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (“Kimberley Process”), a 
public-private partnership for developing an auditable certification pro-
tocol to assure buyers that profits from the sale of gems would not sup-
port governments or paramilitary groups that violate the human rights of 
civilians in conflict zones.24 By design, the Kimberley Process served the 
specific commercial goal of “protect[ing the legitimate diamond indus-
                                                                                                                                  
 22. Levi Strauss & Co., Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, http://www.levi 
strauss.com/Downloads/GSOG.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. World Diamond Council, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com (follow “Resolutions” hyperlink; then follow 
“Kimberley Process Certification Scheme” hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2008). The 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has been specifically approved by the United 
Nations in recognition that it: 
[C]an help to ensure the effective implementation of relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council containing sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds and act 
as a mechanism for the prevention of future conflicts, and calls for the full im-
plementation of existing Council measures targeting the illicit trade in rough 
diamonds, particularly conflict diamonds which play a role in fuelling conflict. 
G.A. Res. 62/11, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/62/L.16 (Nov. 21, 2007). 
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try,”25 and now covers the overwhelming bulk of the world’s trade in 
diamonds.26 Similarly, coffee retailers, like Starbucks, routinely offer 
“fair trade” coffees through the Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices 
(“C.A.F.E.”) program, guaranteeing on every cup that the production and 
marketing of its products did not harm workers or the environment.27 
Like the Kimberley Process, the C.A.F.E program may target the retail 
consumer, but it also regulates business-to-business relationships in the 
supply chain. The apparel industry has also adopted various workplace 
codes of conduct and monitoring protocols to structure a business rela-
tionship in order to assure customers that sweatshop practices are re-
duced or stopped altogether.28 Chiquita Brands International sought to 
market an “Ethical Banana” by adopting an auditable social and envi-
ronmental standard for its farms in Latin America, under the Better Ba-
nana Project (“BBP”) of the Rainforest Alliance.29 Similarly, in the ex-
tractive industry, where private security operations have frequently led to 
human rights violations, a unique partnership of government representa-
tives, corporate officers, and human rights activists has developed a vol-
untary system to minimize the risk of violations.30 
There have also been efforts to define a common measure of corporate 
compliance, to standardize the unilateral codes of conduct, and to offer 
the consumer a readily identifiable mark at the point of purchase. The 
                                                                                                                                  
 25. International Trade: Significant Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Con-
flict Diamonds, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Man-
agement, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-425T, at 6 (2002) (statement of Loren Yager, Director, Inter-
national Affairs and Trade), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/021302yager.pdf. 
 26. For more information on the ongoing successes of the Kimberley Process, see 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
 27. For more information about the C.A.F.E. practices, see SCS Collaboration with 
Starbucks Coffee to Create the C.A.F.E. Practices Program, http://www.scscertified. 
com/csrpurchasing/starbucks.html (last visited May 18, 2008). 
 28. See, e.g., The Fair Labor Ass’n, Workplace Code of Conduct, 
http://www.fairlabor.org/var/uploads/File/The%20Fair%20Labor%20Association%20Wo
rkplace%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008); The Fair Labor 
Association, Principles of Monitoring, http://www.fairlabor.org/docs/FLA_PRINCIPLES 
_OF_MONITORING.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008); The Clean Clothes Campaign, 
Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear, 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2008). 
 29. Rainforest Alliance, Profiles in Sustainable Agriculture: Chiquita Reaps a Better 
Banana (2005), http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/programs/profiles/documents/chiquita 
profile.pdf; Chiquita Banana, Better Banana Project: Working for the Environment 
(2007), http://www.chiquita.com/discover/owbetter.asp.  
 30. See Bennett Freeman, Maria B. Pica & Christopher N. Camponovo, A New Ap-
proach to Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423 (2001). 
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most developed of these efforts is Social Accountability (“SA”) 8000 
(“SA 8000”), a voluntary protocol under which independent auditors cer-
tify that a company complies with human rights standards derived from, 
inter alia, International Labour Organisation conventions, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.31 Nine specific areas are identified in the SA 8000 standard: 
child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association, free-
dom from discrimination, disciplinary practices, work hours, compensa-
tion, and management systems to assure compliance.32 Like other audit-
able standards, including ISO 9000 on quality control and ISO 14001 on 
environmental management, SA 8000 and its cognates33 allow certified 
companies to differentiate themselves from their uncertified competi-
tors.34 Since its introduction, SA 8000 has come to cover hundreds of 
thousands of workers and thousands of factories in scores of countries, 
altering the essential commercial relationship between a company and its 
suppliers. 
Human rights concerns are also present in the investment market: over 
the last decade, individual and institutional investors have adopted social 
or ethical criteria to screen their initial investments and to guide their 
votes as stockholders once the investment is made. The typical target of 
shareholder activism has been sustainable business,35 of which human 
rights responsibility is one component. The dominant investment houses 
have also marketed ethical-investment mutual funds, and the major stock 
markets have developed social indices to guide investors with human 
                                                                                                                                  
 31. Social Accountability International, Overview of SA 8000, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageID=473 (last visited June 1, 2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., European Union [E.U.] Eco-Label Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/envir 
onment/ecolabel/whats_eco/ov_concept_en.htm (last visited May 18, 2008); Fairtrade 
Foundation, http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/fairtrade_foundation.aspx (last 
visited May 18, 2008); G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, http://www.global 
reporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF25F735235CA44/0/G3_Guide 
linesENU.pdf (last visited May 18, 2008). 
 34. Problems with implementing the SA 8000 persist, and the system may rest on the 
fiction of quantifying the unquantifiable (and auditing it) or finding a consumer with 
perfect information who is not driven exclusively by considerations of price. See gener-
ally Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain: 
Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
321 (2007). 
 35. Tim Dickson, The Financial Case for Behaving Responsibly, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
2002, at 5 (defining sustainable business as behavior “that enhances long-term share-
holder value by addressing the needs of all relevant stakeholders and adding economic, 
environmental, and social value through its core business functions”). See also Louisa 
Wah, Treading the Sacred Ground, 87 MGMT. REV. 18–22 (1998). 
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rights concerns.36 An entire ethical consulting industry has also arisen in 
order to assist companies manage risk by adhering to the norms of corpo-
rate citizenship. 
These examples could be multiplied, but even this overview suggests 
that companies routinely perceive a competitive advantage in offering 
rights-sensitive product lines and branding, even if limits on the effec-
tiveness of these initiatives remain clear.37 Indeed, the proliferation of 
these commitments can be traced to the competitive demands placed on a 
corporation, including the need to attract consumers and investors. How-
ever, it also rests on the company’s need to develop sustainable business 
relationships in the marketplace. Business groups, like the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, regu-
larly report on the best practices of their members across industrial sec-
tors, in dozens of countries, implicating a broad range of human rights 
concerns.38 The commercial advantages of human rights entrepreneurial-
ism are clearly not lost on successful competitors. 
II. THE NORMATIVE CLAIM: TOWARDS A UNIFIED PRINCIPLE OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
It is one thing to observe that multinational corporations have increas-
ingly taken on some public commitment to the protection of human 
rights. It is quite another to argue that corporations should take these 
commitments on, especially when governments continue to bear primary 
responsibility at law for the protection of individuals’ human rights. Af-
ter all, the multinational corporation may be better conceived as a bearer 
of rights than as a bearer of obligations in this arena. In this Part, after 
identifying the three principal categories of justifications—
consequentialist, deontological, and positivist—I argue that the theoreti-
                                                                                                                                  
 36. See, e.g., Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability Index, http://www.sustainability-
indexes.com (last visited May 18, 2008); FTSE4Good Index, http://www.ftse4good.com 
(last visited May 18, 2008). These indices are only partial indicators of human rights 
practices because they include only particular areas of corporate responsibility, some of 
which have little to do with human rights. 
 37. See generally Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product La-
beling Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights 
Standards Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111 (1998). 
 38. Examples of such reports produced by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights can be found on their respective Web sites. 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Reports and Studies, http://www.uschamber. 
com/publications/reports/default (last visited May 18, 2008); Business Leaders Initiative 
on Human Rights, Reports and Tools, http://www.blihr.org/ (follow “Reports & Tools” 
hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2008). 
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cal rationales for accepting these obligations (or having them imposed) 
are multiple and reinforcing. 
Consequentialism. A purely consequentialist justification suggests that 
it is in the long-term self-interest of the corporation to bring its practices 
into conformity with at least some subset of human rights standards. The 
orthodox rationale for consequentialism is that a company suffers in 
capital markets if its shares lose value in an increasingly socially-
conscious investment environment, and it suffers in the retail market via 
consumer choices at the point of purchase (including boycotts). With the 
rise of ATS litigation against corporate defendants, it may increasingly 
suffer in a courtroom. The dominant rationale offered by corporations 
that have voluntarily adopted human rights policies is the market reliabil-
ity rationale: to the extent that respect for human rights correlates with a 
commitment to the rule of law, the corporation should choose the more 
ordered, and therefore more profitable, environment. The commercial 
case for corporate human rights responsibility compliance has been ar-
ticulated by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
(1) [Ensuring] Compliance with both Local and International Laws . . . .  
(2) Satisfying Consumer Concerns . . . .  
(3) Promoting the Rule of Law . . . .   
(4) Building Community Goodwill . . . .  
(5) [Improving] Supply Chain Management . . . .   
(6) Enhancing Risk Management . . . .  
(7) Keeping Markets Open . . . .  
(8) Increasing Worker Productivity and Retention . . . .  
(9) Applying Corporate Values[] . . . in ways that . . . . [maintain] the 
faith of employees and external stakeholders in company integrity.39 
Market players confirm this dynamic. For example, the former Presi-
dent of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong observed: 
[W]hile it might not always be the case that trade and business are good 
for human rights, it most certainly is the case that a good human rights 
environment is always good for business. Businesses are acting in their 
                                                                                                                                  
 39.  U.N. High Commission for Human Rights’ Presentation for the Annual Meeting 
of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switz., Jan. 2000, Business and Human Rights: A 
Progress Report, Part I, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/business.htm#I1. 
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own self-interest when they actively promote respect for human rights 
in countries where they operate.40 
Deontological approaches. A second principle of justification is classi-
cally deontological and grounded in the natural law conception of 
rights.41 In this view, human beings have rights simply by virtue of being 
human, regardless of whether these rights have been articulated in posi-
tive law or not, and no one (natural or juridical) is immune from the ob-
ligation to respect and protect those rights. From that perspective, the 
burden of persuasion rests on those who would exclude corporations 
from the human rights initiative, rather than on those who would include 
them. The carve-out from human rights obligations for corporations be-
comes especially problematic as more government operations—like se-
curity, the conduct of armed conflict, and the running of prisons—are 
privatized. Governments cannot privatize their way out of international 
legal obligations to protect human rights. The delegation of public au-
thority to a nominally private actor cannot relieve the government of its 
international legal obligations. Entities, both public and private, should 
be held accountable if human rights are abused in the exercise of gov-
ernment functions, regardless of who—or what—is performing them. 
Positivism. A third rationale is essentially positivistic, as that term of 
art is understood in international law (referring to the practice of states, 
including the adoption of treaties).42 International law has recognized 
                                                                                                                                  
 40. John Kamm, The Role of Businesses in Promoting Respect for Human Rights in 
China, INT’L BUS. ETHICS REV., Nov. 1, 1997, available at http://www.business-
ethics.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=30. Experience over the past decade confirms that the 
market reliability rationale (and similarly consequentialist arguments) continues to be a 
dominant public justification for bringing human rights concerns into the corporate deci-
sion-making process. E.g., Beyond the “Genocide Olympics”, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 
2008, available at http://www.economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id= 
11090045 (last visited May 30, 2008) (“What is striking today is how often activists, big 
firms and governments are now in agreement about the importance of human rights, and 
are working together to advance them.”). See generally DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR 
VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Brookings 
Institution Press 2005). 
 41. See generally PATRICK HAYDEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3–10 (Para-
gon House 2001). 
 42. Since the time of Grotius, the traditional basis for international legal obligations 
has been the consent of states, expressed through treaties and custom. “Positivism” at 
international law refers to the process by which states generate international law in these 
forms, generally out of a sense of their national interest. FERNANDO R. TESON, A 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (Westview Press 1998) (“[P]ositivism rests on 
two pillars: national interest and state consent.”). For a general overview of traditional 
ethical approaches to decision-making by multinational corporations, see THOMAS 
DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (Oxford Univ. Press 1989). 
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two separate circumstances under which a nominally private actor might 
nonetheless bear international responsibility: first, a narrow class of per 
se wrongs identified by treaty and custom that are unlawful even in the 
absence of state action, and second, a broader class of offensive conduct 
that is sufficiently infused with state action to engage international stan-
dards. 
The wrongs in the first category are identified in treaty regimes that 
prohibit certain human rights violations and explicitly override the state 
action requirement. For example, the Genocide Convention requires that 
persons committing genocide be punished, “whether they are constitu-
tionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”43 Cer-
tain aspects of the war crimes regime of the Geneva Convention, espe-
cially common article 3, similarly bind non-state actors when they are 
parties to an international armed conflict.44 The prohibition on slavery is 
quintessentially aimed at acts by individuals in a market setting and is 
unlawful whether there is state action or not.45 The International Law 
Commission (“ILC”), which was directed by the United Nations General 
Assembly to codify the Nuremberg principles, has never required state 
action for wrongs in this category. Indeed, in 1985, the ILC rejected a 
draft that would have limited liability to “State authorities” in favor of a 
draft making all individuals who commit an “offence against the peace 
and security of mankind” liable.46 Routine commercial activity by multi-
national corporations does not typically fall into this class, of course, but 
there is no prophylactic rule that corporations are in principle immune 
from liability for acts that do come within these treaty regimes. 
It is equally clear that multinational corporations cannot be immune 
from human rights obligations for their state-like or state-related activi-
ties. In order words, there may be corporate conduct that falls into the 
second category of non-state liability, namely conduct that becomes in-
ternationally wrongful by virtue of the actor’s relationship with a state. In 
this theory, a mere contractual relationship with a government that com-
                                                                                                                                  
 43. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021.  
 44. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135.  
     45. See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of 
Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S 
L.J. 1, 31–2 (2004) (discussing the Unocal case and how “the law of nations attributes 
individual liability [for engaging in forced labor, the ‘modern variant of slavery’] such 
that state action is not required”).  
 46. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1985] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 7, A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.l (Part 2), at 14, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1985_v2_p2_e.pdf. 
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mits human rights violations should be insufficient to trigger liability—
moral agency theory does not revoke the law of proximate cause. How-
ever, a private actor that fulfills a government function or is in a business 
relationship with a government that requires human rights violations for 
profit should satisfy the standard. And both international and domestic 
law articulate aiding-and-abetting standards that cover both juristic and 
natural individuals.47 
Positivism, like the deontological approach, shifts the burden of proof: 
because the law treats both human beings and corporations as individu-
als, the burden of justification falls to those who carve out an exception 
for companies. A related positivist rationale would not consider the prac-
tice of states internationally but rather the standard company law of most 
municipal legal systems, which provides a crucial quid pro quo: compa-
nies receive from the state the benefit of incorporation, meaning the right 
to exist and to limit the liability of stockholders to the extent of their in-
vestment, and, in exchange for that considerable and profitable right, 
they can be expected to serve the public interest and not abuse their 
privileges.48 
The common principle in these positivist approaches is the understand-
ing that international law is not different in kind from other sources of 
obligation for the modern corporation. It is well-established that a corpo-
ration might be liable in tort for damages caused by the negligence or 
intentional acts of its employees,49 that a corporation can violate the 
property rights of others and be required to pay damages or to obey an 
injunction, and that a corporation can be guilty of criminal offenses in-
cluding conspiracy and aiding and abetting,50 The human rights norms 
                                                                                                                                  
 47. The predictable variation at the margins of the international aiding-and-abetting 
standard—whether within international institutions or among the municipal legal systems 
around the world—does not undermine its core denotation. In United States v. Smith, 18 
U.S. 153 (1820), the Supreme Court had to determine the international definition of pi-
racy, and the Court discerned a lowest common denominator among the practice of states 
and the scholarly consensus. Specifically, the Court acknowledged controversy in some 
particulars but concluded that “whatever may be the diversity of definitions in other re-
spects, all writers concur in holding that robbery or forcible depredations upon the sea, 
animo furandi [i.e., with the intention to steal] is piracy.” Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
 48. See DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 27–28 (N.Y.U. Press 
2001) (arguing that U.S. state legislatures historically imputed a duty upon corporations 
to serve the public interest in every undertaking and in no way viewed them as merely 
vehicles of profit). 
 49. See FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE 145–47 
(Charles K. Burdick ed., Banks & Co. 4th ed. 1926). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).  
 50. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE CORPORATE LITIGATOR 643 (Francis J. Burke, Jr. 
& Michael Goldblatt eds., 1989). 
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imposed on, or undertaken by, the corporation are similarly compatible 
with their juristic status. 
III. THE ANALYTICAL CLAIM: THROUGH THE LENS OF LEX MERCATORIA 
The history of the law merchant is that best commercial practices 
started as a form of spontaneous or voluntary order and, if they survived, 
gradually became codified in the commercial law of states,51 evolving 
ultimately into international trade law and the U.N. Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods.52 Contemporary scholars have 
prolonged a hundred years war over whether the lex mercatoria existed 
independently of municipal law and what its substantive norms—if 
any—were.53 There is, however, a wide consensus that the law in its 
positivist forms eventually replicated certain customary practices at the 
heart of an effective and ethical transnational business order. 
In the sources and content of norms governing corporate responsibility, 
it is possible to see the emergence of a new lex mercatoria—a contempo-
rary variant of the medieval and renaissance law merchant. The lex mer-
catoria was developed and enforced as a tool to promote better business 
practices through offers of security to consumers and other merchants. 
The lex mercatoria also served an interstitial role, filling the gaps of each 
jurisdiction’s commercial law and harmonizing disparate approaches in 
                                                                                                                                  
 51. Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial 
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (1978) (noting that certain wide-
spread similarities in legal doctrines governing the allocation of risk of loss or damage to 
goods, standard clauses in bills of lading or letters of credit, and arbitration clauses are 
“due in part to common commercial needs shared by all who participate in international 
trade transactions”). See also WYNDHAM A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW 
MERCHANT 28–62 (1923) (demonstrating that certain doctrines of contemporary com-
mercial law can be traced through the law merchant and ultimately to medieval business 
customs, including the enforceability of informal agreements, the rights of a possessor of 
a bearer bill of exchange, the protection of the good faith purchaser of stolen goods even 
against the original owner when the goods were bought in the “open market,” the right of 
a seller to stop the transit of goods if the buyer defaults after shipment, and the right of 
partners to an accounting). Accord LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE 
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 25–26, 33 (1983) (describing similarities between the 
ancient lex mercatoria and the modern Uniform Commercial Code in the United States). 
 52. Cf. John Honnold, The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Devel-
opment and Character of English and American Commercial Law, in THE SOURCES OF 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70, 76 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1964). 
 53. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of 
the Law Merchant: Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of the 
Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early 
Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21 
(2004).  
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different markets and nations. The law’s genesis in the customs of the 
marketplace 
was by far the most decisive factor in its development: it made the law 
eminently a practical law adapted to the requirements of commerce; 
and as trade expanded and new forms of commercial activity arose—
negotiable paper, insurance, etc.—custom everywhere fashioned and 
framed the broad general principles of the new law. Custom is alike the 
ruling principle and the originating force of the Law Merchant.54 
In this way, the lex mercatoria became one model for innovation in the 
introduction of new legal principles and doctrines, originating and evolv-
ing from the initiative of merchants who were motivated by a long-term, 
sophisticated, and mutual self-interest. As a result, key entrepreneurial 
concepts and practices found their way into the commercial law of 
states—and ultimately into contemporary international trade law and the 
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The 
international legal order thereby replicated and formalized the ethical 
business order, rather than displacing, coercing, or pre-empting it.55 
But there were more than merely utilitarian reasons for the emergence 
and the stability of lex mercatoria: the influence of canon law tended to 
inject transnational standards of good faith and equity into commercial 
dealings as well: 
Canon law, the body of universal law and procedure developed by the 
[Roman Catholic] Church for its own governance and to regulate the 
rights and obligations of its communicants, had from the beginning its 
own sphere of application and separate courts. . . . [But] there was a 
tendency towards overlapping jurisdiction, and before the Reformation 
it was common to find ecclesiastical courts exercising civil jurisdic-
tion.56 
                                                                                                                                  
 54. WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT 
12 (1904). 
 55. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2000). Incoterms 
is a source of international uniform definitions for commercial delivery terms, which 
defines the obligations of sellers and buyers regarding shipment and receipt of goods. 
Because its publisher, the International Chamber of Commerce, is a non-governmental 
entity, Incoterms does not have the legally binding effect of an international treaty. But it 
does provide a written expression of custom and usage—or best practice—in the indus-
try. Parties to international transactions often expressly incorporate Incoterms into their 
contracts, and even when they do not, courts will occasionally incorporate them. RALPH 
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 72 (West 2d ed. 2001). 
 56. J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–26 (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
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For that reason, it was perhaps inevitable that jurisprudence of the 
Church would converge with (and to some extent displace) the Roman 
civil law:57 the pragmatic need for cooperation, combined with the “spiri-
tual jurisprudence” then ascendant, assured that merchants would act 
with some sense of mutual restraint in their dealings with one another.58 
As a result, the merchant had to rely on standards of fairness, which 
changed in accordance with commercial practice. The influence of canon 
law is illustrated by the fact that by the sixteenth century, virtually every 
commercial nation in Europe had altered prior doctrine and, in response 
to the usages of the merchant class, recognized the enforceability of a 
bona fide purchaser’s rights, the validity of sales confirmed by the pay-
ment of earnest money, the validity and enforceability of formless con-
tracts, the negotiability of bills of exchange, the obligations of partners 
and agents, and the necessity of swift justice ex aequo et bono.59 In each 
of these respects, commercial habits and practices were transformed into 
legal institutions, doctrines, and codes, with the result that the law was 
increasingly uniform—even as it became increasingly cosmopolitan and 
equitable. 
The lex mercatoria was also distinguished by the ways that its norms 
were enforced and commercial disputes were resolved. The dominant 
mode of enforcement was the internalization of norms by entrepreneurs 
themselves.60 One determinant of a merchant’s sustained prosperity was 
his ability to conform to the expectations of the market, which were for-
malized only over time into law; there were concrete commercial conse-
quences for any merchant insufficiently committed to the abstract stan-
dards of good faith that underlay the pragmatic doctrines in the law mer-
chant. When internalization failed and disputes did arise, they were typi-
cally resolved by the merchants themselves through mercantile councils 
and guilds or through informal, expeditious forms of mediation and arbi-
tration—not by professional judges in the formal setting of a courtroom. 
When a dispute became sufficiently serious or prolonged that the local 
courts became involved, the law that governed was—directly or indi-
                                                                                                                                  
 57. Id. at 26. See also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY 
OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 190 (1970) (demonstrating that, 
in the early medieval period, a “new and Christian tinge” came to color contractual obli-
gations and commercial law generally). 
 58. TRAKMAN, supra note 50, at 7. 
 59. MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 157–58. 
 60. Cf. Harold H. Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Proc-
ess, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–06 (1996). 
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rectly—what the merchants had themselves adopted to facilitate ethical 
and uniform trade practices.61 
It will be noted that the lex mercatoria, in its original form, effectively 
blurred the received distinction between self-interest and altruism. Adam 
Smith fully understood the reinforcing dynamic between these two 
forces; Smith is commonly invoked by advocates of laissez-faire capital-
ism who stress those passages in the Wealth of Nations that find the “in-
visible hand” in rational economic actors pursuing their self-interest.62 
That emphasis however ignores the balance at work in Smith’s philoso-
phy, especially in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, which focuses on 
the innate sense of empathy with which human beings regulate their in-
stinct for acquisitive self-interest.63 It radically oversimplifies Smith’s 
theory of capitalism to suggest that individuals in natural or juristic form 
are exempt from the dictates of conscience or equity; indeed (and per-
haps counter-intuitively), the distinction between altruism and self-
interest cannot adequately account for the variance in commercial deci-
sion-making by individuals, by firms, and by nations. If it did, the ra-
                                                                                                                                  
 61. MITCHELL, supra note 53, at 156; BERMAN & KAUFMAN, supra note 50, at 226–
27. For example: 
Through the decisions of Lord Mansfield and his successors, there was created 
a body of judicially declared English commercial law which incorporated and 
refined rules developed in earlier times throughout Europe. The incorporation 
of the law merchant added a cosmopolitan dimension to the English common 
law, without which the common law courts could hardly have served the needs 
of British commerce. 
Id. at 226–27.  
 62. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976).  
[The individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public inter-
est, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [He] intends only his own se-
curity; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of 
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention. 
Id. See also Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; The Many Faces of Adam Smith: Redis-
covering ‘The Wealth of Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at C2 (discussing Emma 
Rothschild’s view that “Smith has been reinvented as a narrow, unyielding defender of 
unfettered free enterprise”). 
 63. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 11 (1759) (“How selfish 
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”). 
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tional breach of contracts would be nearly universal, and pacta sunt ser-
vanda would become the relic of a naïve age. 
In sum, lex mercatoria comprised a body of authority that was (and 
remains to this day) transnational in scope, grounded in good faith, re-
flective of market practices, and codified in the commercial law of the 
various nations and in international law. Because these features reappear 
in some emerging forms of commercial law in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, these new pockets of law have been described as “a” or 
“the” new lex mercatoria.64 But with consequences not yet fully appreci-
ated by either the corporate community or the human rights commu-
nity—let alone the academic community—the corporate human rights 
standards described above offer fertile ground for the emergence of a 
similarly stable and significant body of commercial standards. 
It is clear at the threshold that the market-based initiatives described in 
Part I reflect the apparent competitive advantages of establishing and 
projecting a reputation for equitable conduct and a measure of transpar-
ency in corporate decision-making. The Kimberley Plan governing the 
sale of conflict diamonds, the evolution of SA 8000, and the sale of 
rights-sensitive product lines, inter alia, suggest that the market ulti-
mately gives new relevance to international human rights standards in the 
global economy. It would be neither unprecedented nor illegitimate if 
what began as the articulation and internalization of best business prac-
tices became enforceable legal standards over time, either through do-
mestic regulation, international standard-setting, or, in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the prospect of civil liability. There is, in short, a critical 
historical connection between best practices in the market and the rules 
of law: “In all great matters relating to commerce, the legislators have 
copied, not dictated.”65 
CONCLUSION 
One critique of this analysis rests on the truth that human rights stan-
dards are not yet common business conventions, let alone universal 
norms. Nor are they conspicuously successful. Nor do they cement the 
                                                                                                                                  
 64. Examples include, among others, the law of cyberspace. See, e.g., Aron Mefford, 
Note, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 211 (1997); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). Examples also include the norms adopted 
in transnational arbitration panels. Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The “New” Law 
Merchant and the “Old”: Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION 21 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990). 
 65. GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 378–79 (1891), quoted in Trak-
man, supra note 50, at 10. 
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relationship among merchants through reciprocal assurances of commer-
cial good faith. To the contrary, the principal beneficiary of these stan-
dards (and the “altruism” behind them) is not the mercantile community 
itself; it is a labor force, a society, or even an idea. But the genetic 
marker of the lex mercatoria was that seemingly soft notions like good 
faith evolved into widely accepted standards—standards that became 
some of the hardest commercial law there is and originated in the notion 
that a merchant’s self-interest depended on his or her respect for the in-
terests of others. In other words, at the substantive core of this suppos-
edly private law were public values, and at the procedural core of what 
became commercial law were voluntary undertakings of the merchant 
class.66 
It is in addition ahistorical to require that so new a development be 
wholly formed before it can be taken seriously. In the synergistic dy-
namic that was the lex mercatoria, practices affected rules, which af-
fected practices, which refined rules, and so on over the centuries. This 
dynamic allowed a communal sense of fairness or equity to emerge and 
get transformed into doctrinal form. That dynamic is again on display as 
the business and legal culture changes in response to the four regimes of 
principle and practice described above. It also suggests that the business 
community and the human rights community might assist one another in 
the articulation of a common sense of justice and the development of 
legal standards to maximize the benefits of compliance at decreasing 
marginal cost. 
In short, human rights entrepreneurialism, the codes of conduct, the 
ATS litigation in Unocal and its progeny, the work of groups like the 
RiskMetrics Group,67 and the adoption of domestic and international le-
gal norms reflect a partial, but very real, development at the intersection 
of the law and the marketplace. Indeed, the corporate human rights initia-
tive mirrors the two dominant faces of globalization: the expansion of 
international trade and commerce without regard to boundaries and the 
                                                                                                                                  
   66. See Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508 (N.D. 1924). As stated by the 
court: 
The law merchant is a system of law that [did] not rest exclusively on the insti-
tutions and local customs of any particular country, but consists of certain prin-
ciples of equity and usages of trade which general convenience and a common 
sense of justice have established to regulate the dealings of merchants . . . in all 
the commercial countries of the civilized world. 
Id. at 508. 
   67. The RiskMetrics Group is a signatory to the United Nations’ Principles for Respon-
sible Investment (“UNPRI”). Principles for Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri. 
org/principles/ (last visited June 1, 2008).  
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universalizing effects of the human rights movement—the only global 
ideology to survive the twentieth century. Without suggesting that the 
corporate culture is about to enter some millennial Age of Aquarius, we 
will see the continued development of broad-based organizations specifi-
cally devoted to bringing human rights issues into the corporate board-
room, the modest growth of a consumer- and investor-driven market dy-
namic that embraces human rights concerns, the imposition of civil and 
criminal liability in appropriate circumstances, and a continuing trans-
formation in the work of human rights advocates, all of which reinforces 
the insight that we must not think too simply about corporate decision-
making, about human rights law, or about the received distinction be-
tween so-called public and so-called private law. 
 
